Reform Infatuations

Like so many other laymen with an interest in this sort of thing (and some experience with navigating it in associated fields), I have been paying close attention to recent, revived interest in the need to reform elements of our national constitution, ostensibly to bring the document in closer alignment with contemporary needs.

There have been peaks and troughs in wider interest over the years, and this phase too shall pass. So, let’s at least try to leave a better imprint this time around.

Public interest is sporadic even as those with vested interests, through advocacy of one kind or the other, persist in advancing both specific and general manifestations of national values.

The experts acknowledge that constitutions have as much to do with national aspirations and values as they have with application of law.

So, it’s fine for regular folks to provide broad expressions of concern and to propose changes more in keeping with what they see as necessary to move from one developmental point to the next. There won't be instant unanimity.

So, prompted by yet another wave of public interest, the Prime Minister has gone so far as to appoint an “advisory committee” headed by former House Speaker, Barendra Sinanan, and including an impressive mix of public figures, to formulate terms of reference for another national consultation on reforming the constitution.

Nothing wrong with that, though some are already declaring the effort’s redundancy in the face of a variety of starkly under-developed ideas on how the country can function better on the basis of constitutional principles.

The late Basdeo Panday, for example, can be credited posthumously with the current project because “constitutional reform” was a refrain that frequently bore his trademark eloquence.

Yet, I have never encountered, in his case, the kind of rigour required to convert generalised, fanciful intention into tangible language to inform serious review.

What, specifically, would be needed in the language of our collective statement of values to correct democratic deficiencies, address systemic faults in the hierarchy of governance, and generally render the preamble, rooted in human rights, an essential constitutional pillar?

Identifying technical prescriptions would have been useful. For example, drafters would have had great difficulty identifying the specific features of a system of proportional representation to address this notion of all-inclusive governance.

There are several models. Right here, within Caricom, there are examples to be found in Guyana and in Suriname. They operate systems of PR and have unicameral legislatures. Yet, even so, there are recurrent arguments, in these countries, focused on the entrenchment of privilege regarding different groups.

In neither case, has there been a minimisation of political conflict and alienation. Nor has there been the kind of consensus-based decision-making to distinguish these two neighbours from the rest of us where “winner-takes-all” is the order of the day.

Notions of “power-sharing” are also quite elusive by way of actual models.

Indeed, the option to explore unique pathways to such an arrangement in our case was rejected a least three times, (albeit bearing different features) – in 1986 with a 33-3 electoral outcome, in 1995 when the DAC held the balance of power following a 17-17 split, and in 2001 with an 18-18 outcome.

In the latter case, “power-sharing” options emerged in different forms but were rejected outright by all the key players, including advocates of such a condition.

It was then proven that it is the practice and habits of politics and not constitutional dictat that are the most influential factors in moving away from the current malaise.

Helen Drayton’s important column last Sunday also questions the effectiveness of reform under a variety of circumstances through which official, societal, and political behaviour are more likely to engender changes in circumstances. Go back and have a close read. Constitution reform is no miracle cure.

On a not unrelated note, what of the Caribbean Court of Justice? Mr Panday went on record to describe it as a vital building block toward the achievement of true independence as Caribbean states. It is one by-product of a revised Treaty of Chaguaramas frequently paraded before us as an international pact to which we voluntarily and boastfully subscribed.

How come the required changes to implant the CCJ as our final court of appeal, are not a part of our constitutional setup? We now have an attorney general who once expressed strong support for this, and a revered leader on the other side who gave it high ratings in its developmental stages.

The fact is, we may well find that those most heavily engaged in calling for reform of the constitution are among the least predisposed to any change. But let’s see how this latest infatuation goes.