When Regional Integration Works

 First published in the T&T Guardian on Feb 10, 2021

There has recently been sufficient for many to condense public life in our small republic into a single, tragic story of murderous stories. There is validity to this, and we should never shift our sights too far away from root causes and prospective solutions.

Yet, if we are to eventually prevail as a nation, our field of vision must as much capture breadth and periphery as it reflects depth and dimension on chosen matters. We need to remain alert to other challenges that have the potential to undermine our advance into the future.

Over recent weeks, for instance, I have been spending time looking at the contribution of regional integration in addressing pandemic issues and its role in recovery efforts everywhere.

We already know of the royal Brexit mess. So, none of that today. But another learning opportunity can be found in the current plight of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) – the rough equivalent of the Caribbean Forum (Cariforum) which comprises Caricom plus the Dominican Republic.

If you have travelled there or studied the connections, you would realise that in many respects, there is more in common between the insular Pacific and the Caribbean, than there is between Latin America and our sub-region.  The PIF is also a key partner in EU/ACP relations.

Last week, contrary to longstanding practice, rotation of the post of PIF Secretary-General by consensus was superseded by an unprecedented election for the post – an act inspired by geo-political shenanigans with poles aligned to Australia and New Zealand (members of the PIF), and the United States.

The result was the departure of Palau and the threatened withdrawal of the other small Micronesian member nations – part of a narrative that spans almost 80 years.

The longevity of this conundrum is reminiscent of the circumstances surrounding the Venezuela problem - the role of dominant and domineering global powers and the counterbalance of regional institutions.

But, like the Pacific, our own self-confidence – expressed as international self-awareness - has often fallen short of the requirements of real independence.

The OAS is in near shambles and Caricom cohesion has been similarly affected by the clash between Bolivarian imperialism and hegemonic US intent.

Notably, and ironically, among the more unifying challenges of that period has been Venezuela’s persistent territorial conflict with Guyana.

To be clear, Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo region did not arise because of Guyana’s recent hydrocarbon finds or Maduro’s January decree, nor did it enter the Caricom agenda in 2019 following problematic elections in Venezuela.

There is partisan disinformation designed to draw negative attention to T&T’s role in all this. But Caricom’s position on Venezuela’s imperialistic designs is longstanding and has crossed political divides. “Guyana-Venezuela Relations” has also been one of the more persistent Caricom agenda items spanning decades.

In July 2010, for example (note the date), Caricom leaders in a Summit communiqué “reaffirmed their unequivocal support for the safeguarding of Guyana ’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and its right to develop its resources in the entirety of its territory.”

Again, in 2016, even as things warmed up hemispherically, the leaders “reiterated their full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all CARICOM States and their entitlement to rights regarding maritime zones under international law.”

It is an issue that has long enjoyed common posturing throughout Caricom, in Guyana, and in Venezuela. So much so that in Guyana, even now, there is bipartisan agreement on this.

In Venezuela, it has also transcended the political aisle. Both the Maduro regime and the Guaidó claimants to office have pointed accusatory fingers at each other with claims of reduced passion on this matter.

So, while tyranny and deprivation in Venezuela have proven to be polarising regional issues, the country’s conflict with Guyana has not. The territorial controversy also did not emerge in 2019 but goes back to an Arbitral Award in 1899 involving the UK and Venezuela.

Last week, T&T’s independent position on domestic Venezuela politics positioned it favourably to play a role in the release of Guyanese fishermen (unlawfully) detained by Venezuelan authorities on January 23. We must note the efforts of minister Amery Browne.

In an accompanying statement, there was the studious omission by the Venezuelans of reference to Caricom but mention of the grouping’s campaign for the Caribbean as a “Zone of Peace.”

No Trump. No Mondello. No Biden. Only Caricom and an unwavering commitment to a key member. Regional integration worked.

Tobago - the lost opportunity

I have not yet seen the view being openly explored, that a relatively fanciful but theoretically feasible solution to the THA impasse exists. The point actually came up, albeit fleetingly, on election night. It had also been raised several times during the internal self-government debates. But that has been all.

The fact is, there is a way to considerably satisfy the desires of almost everyone who voted on January 25. It is not unlike the prospect offered in December 2001 when we awoke on December 11 to the knowledge that the country had been split right down the middle in its political support for two main contenders.

As is the case in Tobago today, the constitution and electoral law were capable of only reaching the point of installation of elected officials, but not of activating the mechanisms to resume formal representation, and therefore island governance.

But these things are not just an issue of constitutions and laws. They are the stuff of politics – especially the politics of national development.

I remember the shenanigans of 2001 relatively well. Academia ought to have captured the dialogue and made sense of it. I am not sure whether this has ever been done. Where are the books? The papers.

When the moment arrived 19 plus years ago, there could have been an avalanche of knowledgeable opinion and analysis. Instead, all it found was pervasive partisan preference through all sectors of the national community, including academia. The quick resort to shibboleth prevailed. And we went nowhere.

It was the late Lloyd Best who captured the moment by proposing a reformulation of not only the constitutional models, but the political behaviours required to advance the game. Even so, the main players were not oblivious to the possibilities of the occasion. We were hearing the talk.

Could there have realistically been a rotation of command? The excavation of the best available skills and competence from among the ranks of the competitors – across the electoral aisle in the formation of a government of national unity? Whatever the public posturing, nobody really cared for the gigantic task. People could not understand that even under such circumstances, in a maturing country, the notion of civil society led opposition and participation is eminently possible.

In Guyana, such a question has arisen numerous times. But even as proportional representation heads off the mathematical possibility of a “tie”, on-the-ground political realities do more to reinforce division than the country’s constitution does to mitigate it. This should instruct those whose constant refrain in T&T is for “constitution reform.” They need to say what they really mean by this. They have not.

In this instance, the main reason for changing the rules cannot only be to break tied results. There ought to be a way to freely permit the arrangements necessary to enable willing political parties and their representatives to coalesce in the public interest.

To me, for example, there is little by way of broad policy prescription to distinguish the major players in Tobago – as is mostly the case nationally. Whoever emerges “victorious” – whether by way of fresh elections or judicially-induced solution – we are more likely to get, in a general sense, more of the same.

True, there is a feeling that longstanding strangleholds on power need to be discouraged – even as the PNM itself resided in the virtual THA wilderness between 1980 and 2001 but has held on since then. There is also the discomfiting spectre of corruption.

But who, for example, is going to overturn the provisions, made possible by the 1996 Dispute Resolution Commission, to allocate between 4.03 and 6.9 per cent of the national budget to Tobago’s financial affairs?

Who is going to negotiate a retreat from 70 per cent THA employment and all this means for private industry, independent food production, and entrepreneurship?

It is not that I am unaware of the dynamic which dictates what, prima facie, appears to be a disproportional per capita share of the national spoils. But even opponents of the measure are highly unlikely to reject this on their own turf.

I know. I know. It’s a whistle in the wind. But as a small country making our way in the world under difficult circumstances – today the pandemic – we cannot be shy about engaging our development in bold new ways.

But it seems like we are going to miss yet another opportunity to change the nature of the game, even if the rules continue to hold or are adjusted for convenience.